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The conclusion seems inevitable that if the courts are going to
retain their traditional status as guardians of constitutional rights
in today's modern era, when much of what has been deemed sacred
is being questioned, a more forthright examination of legislation
that impinges on these rights must be presented than that found in
Leary v. United States. Even though the scientific evidence is not
entirely conclusive, when first amendment rights are at stake a
court cannot ignore the empirical studies, close its ears to the growing dissent over the national policy regarding marihuana, disregard
the increasing discontent with the Judeo-Christian heritage which
has led many to search for new meaningful experiences, and still
maintain guardianship status. It is also doubtful that any true
"balancing" or adjustment of competing interests can be made
when such pertinent considerations are not included in the determination, and this is especially so when an extraordinary weight is
accorded the dead hand of the past. It is submitted that if and
when the guarantee of religious freedom is given its due, these considerations will be acknowledged and then it might be found that
psychedelic religious experience and the "national welfare" are not
antithetical.
STEPHEN M. O'BRYAN

INTERNAL REVENUE - 1965 TREASURY REGULATIONS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATIONS
O'Neill v,United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
The concept of the "professional association or corporation" is
characteristic of a new trend in professional practice. Since the
1930's, and especially since the end of World War II, the growth
of "professional corporations" has been significant in number.' In
many states today accountants, attorneys, physicians, pharmacists,
optometrists, and others performing professional services are permitted by statute to incorporate.2
1 Eaton, Professional Corporationsand Associations in Perspective, 23 TAX L. REV.
1, 6 (1967). The growth of "professional corporations" is most noticeable within the
medical profession. "According to the Public Health Service, there were in 1959,
at least 1,623 medical groups of three or more persons, 22.7% of which were incorporated. . . . A reasonable estimate is that today there are at least 3,000 medical
corporations and associations, not to mention other professions." Eaton & Maycock,
Final Professional Corporation Regulations are an Improvement - But Not Much,
22 J.TAxATioN 208-09 (1965).
2As of November 1967, 36 states had enacted "professional corporation" laws.
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In an effort to halt the continuing growth of professional corporations the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the 1965
Treasury Regulations.3 These regulations destroyed the primary
incentive for professional incorporation by depriving these corporations of the benefits of corporate tax treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.'
In the recent case of O'Neill v. United States,5 the validity of
these regulations was squarely challenged.' The plaintiff was one
of 14 doctors employed by Drs. Hill & Thomas Co., a professional
association under Ohio law providing radiological services to hospital and individual patients. In 1966 the plaintiff paid federal
income tax as a partner in Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. Later the plaintiff sued the United States for a refund of federal income tax paid
for the year 1966 maintaining that he should have paid his income
tax as an employee-stockholder and not as a partner of Drs. Hill
& Thomas Co.7 After a careful examination of Ohio's professional
Eaton, supra note 1, at 9. "Similar legislation has been introduced in approximately
14 other states, leaving New Hampshire as the only state where nothing has been
done... As recently as 1967 there has been legislative activity in Kansas, Montana
and West Virginia." Id. at 9 n.52.
a Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851, 852 (D. Colo. 1967) (appeal pending).
See Eaton, supra note 1, at 15.
4When "classified as 'corporations' for federal income tax purposes, [professional
corporations) ...will permit physicians, attorneys, and other professionals to enjoy
the federal income tax advantages of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans and
other devices open only to 'employees' ....... Bittker, Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxa ion: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 1-2 (1961).
5281 F. Supp. 35? (N.D. Ohio 1968).
6 The first case challenging the validity of the 1965 Treasury Regulations was
Empey v. United Stats, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967) (appeal pending). In this
case the plaintiff, a stockholder-employee of Dexler and Wald Co., a law firm incorporated under q6lorado law, sued for a refund of 1965 income tax maintaining
that the law firm *as a professional service corporation and not a partnership. The
court held for the laintiff and ruled the 1965 Treasury Regulations invalid. In addition, the court ruled that even if the regulations were valid, a law firm incorporated
under a state statute "was a corporation for federal income tax purposes," because it
exhibited characteristics which resembled the characteristics of corporations in general.
Id. at 854.
7 The difference in the amount of tax [$2164.69) results from: (1) the right
to deduct as a corporation certain expenditures on behalf of the doctors who
would be both the corporation's shareholders and employees, which would
not be deductible by the doctors as partners in reporting their income from
a partnership; (2) the attribution to the doctors as partners of all of a
partnership's net income rather than only the salaries and any dividends
which they received as employees and shareholders of a corporation. The
deductions to which only a corporation would be entitled are those relating
to deferred compensation through pensions and profit-sharing plans which
must be for the benefit of an "employee", a term which for these purposes
does not include a member of a partnership. Brief for Defendant at 2 n.1,
O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
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association law8 the court held that Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. was
a corporation under Ohio law and concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to a refund.
The court then considered Treasury Regulation 301.7701-2.'
Subsections (a-g) apply to all business organizations and prescribe
the following corporate characteristics as necessary to qualify an
organization for corporate tax treatment: (1) associates, (2) doing
business and dividing profits, (3) centralized management, (4)
limited liability, (5) continuity of life, and (6) transferability of
interests.'" Subsection (h) of the regulations applies only to professional corporations and states in part that a professional corporation must possess the same corporate characteristics as any other
business organization to qualify for corporate tax treatment under
the Code. The standards for determining possession of the corporate characteristics under subsection (h), however, are different.
Under subsections (a-g) business organizations are classified as
corporations if they exhibit characteristics which resemble the characteristics of corporations in general. Under subsection (h) professional corporations are classified as corporations only if they
exhibit characteristics which are identical to the characteristics of
an academic corporation as outlined in the regulations."
One
important conclusion to be drawn from the stringent requirements
for professional incorporation under the 1965 Treasury Regulations "is that professional corporations . . . will almost never be
taxed as corporations."12
The significant issue before the O'Neill court was the validity
of the discrimination against the "professional corporation" con8 OHIo Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 1785.01-.08 (Page Supp. 1966). The O'Neill court
was faced with a case of first impression under section 1785.04 in deciding whether a
professional corporation enjoys limited liability under the Ohio statute. The court found
that the shareholders of professional corporations in Ohio did have limited liability
"[s]ince the [Ohio] statute refers to the person who performs and the person who
receives professional service [and not to] . .. shareholders of a professional association
in their capacity as shareholders." Vesely, The Ohio ProfessionalAssociation Law, 13
W. RES. L. REv. 195, 203 (1962).
9
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 553.
10 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
1
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(1)(i) (1965). The regulations
apply to a single class of corporations and associations, namely, professional
organizations, a special set of illogical standards which are not applied to
others. They seek to deny corporate status to professional organizations
under the test of identity, while treating all other organizations as corporate
if they either are corporate in form or meet the fuzzy test of resemblance.
Eaton, supra note 1, at 33.
12 Eaton, ProfessionalAssociations as Planning Techniques, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 671-72 (1966).
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tained in section 301.7701-2 (h) of the Treasury Regulations. The
court resolved the issue by ruling this section invalid. 3 "The discrimination [the court found was] not supported by the statute,
judicial precedent, or sound tax policy.""'
The court first questioned whether the discrimination against
professional corporations in section 301.7701-2(h) was supported
by the statutory language of the Internal Revenue Code. The
government had contended that section 301.7701-2(h), construing
section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code, prescribed a valid test
for determining whether a business organization is a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. In support of its position, the government pointed to many cses where unincorporated business organizations had been found to have corporate characteristics for federal
tax purposes. 5 It would logically follow then that business organizations, like Drs. Hill & Thomas Co., incorporatedunder state statutes could well be found not to possess the corporate characteristics
necessary to qualify them for corporate tax treatment.
The court held the government's position to be inconsistent
with the statutory language in section 7701(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code.'" Section 7701(a), the court noted, delineates what
is meant by the terms corporation and partnership. Under the
Code partnership is said to include in part "a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization ....""
The term corporation under the Code includes "associations, jointstock companies, and insurance companies.""
No provision is
made under either of the definitions for the incorporated business
organization. While the Code's definition of partnership specif13 The O'Neill court was the first court to hold only section 301.7701-2(h) of the
regulations to be invalid. Empey v. United States went further holding the whole set of
regulations to be invalid. The two recent cases of Kurzner v. United States, P-H 1968
FED. TAx SnRv. (21 Am. Fed. Tax P.2d 5 68.5049 (N.D. Fla. July 3, 1968), and
Holder v. United States, P-H 1968 FED. TAX SERv. (21 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d) 5
68-5051 (N.D. Ga. July 18, 1968), have sustained the O'Neill approach holding only
section 301.7701-2(h) to be invalid.
14 281 F. Supp. at 364.
I 5 See, e.g., Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert, 296 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1936); Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1936); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
362, 365 (1936); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1936); United
States v. Kinmer, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cit. 1954); Foreman v. United States, 232 F.
Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Texas
1959).
16 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 7701 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE). These definitions have remained unchanged since their enactment in 1917. 7 J. MERT NS,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38.02 (1967).
17 CODE § 7701(a)(2) (emphasis added).
181d. § 7701(a)(3).
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ically includes other unincorporated organizations it prescribes no
criteria for determining what is an unincorporated organization.
In the absence of meaningful criteria, one is drawn to the conclusion that state law determinations were meant to be applied."
If indeed this is the applicable test, a business organization
incorporated under state law could never be an unincorporated
organization under the Code definition of partnership. Thus, the
business organization incorporated under state law must necessarily
be considered a corporation under the Code definition. Reaching
this conclusion the O'Neill court stated "that any attempt by the
Treasury through regulation... to tax an incorporated entity as a
partnership . . . runs directly contrary to the language of Section
7701(a)(2) and must be stricken as beyond the statutory purpose."2
The court also questioned whether the regulation's discrimination against the professional corporations was supported by judicial precedent. The government had contended that section 301.7701-2 (h) of the Treasury Regulations was a valid "interpretative rule"21 that should be given special consideration by the
courts." The government maintained that section 7701 (a) (2) of
the Internal Revenue Code had been reenacted without change in
successive revenue acts since 1917 and that this reenactment indicated legislative approval of the Commissioner's interpretation that
state labels are of little significance in determining whether a
business organization qualifies for corporate tax treatment under
the federal income tax laws.
An examination of the legislative history of section 7701(a)(2),
however, gives no indication that Congress has ever examined this
particular section of the Code indepth.2" Further, no judicial pre19 Accord, Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 622-23 (1965).
20 281 F. Supp. at 363.
21 Regulations generally are broken down into two classes, namely "interpretive rules" and "legislative rules." . . . Courts will normally consider legislative rules in the light of the authorizing legislation, and will not disturb the
rule unless it is unreasonable and not within the authority granted. On the
other hand interpretive rules are subject to judicial reversal merely on the
independent judgment of the judge. Even though the Internal Revenue Code
specifically provides that the Commissioner shall have the power to promulgate all necessary rules and regulations for the enforcement of the taxes therein levied, these regulations have been held to be interpretive regulations.
Editorial, ProfessionalAssociationsin Ohio, 31 U. CIN. L. REV. 71, 74 (1962).
22 Courts have often attributed considerable significance to the interpretative regulations due to the fact that these regulations are often the subject of legislative reenactment and long-standing administrative interpretation. See Rogovin, The Four R's:
Regulation, Ruling, Reliance, and Retroactivity, 43 TAxEs 156 (1965).
23 281 F. Supp. at 363.
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cedent exists to support the Commissioner's interpretation that a
state labeled corporation could be found to be a partnership for
federal tax purpose.2" In the absence of indepth Congressional
examination of section 7701 (a) (2) and in the absence of judicial
decisions interpreting that section, the government's argument
based solely on legislative reenactment was tenuous at best.
The government further argued that section 7701(a)(2) was
entitled to special significance by the courts because it had been
the subject of long-standing administrative interpretation. The
court found, however, that the government's position with respect
to professional corporations was neither consistent nor long-standing. The government's shifting course has been briefly charted as
follows:
[T]he Treasury has gone from the pre-Kintner regulations sweeping all doubtful cases into the corporate category, to a more neutral
position in the Kintner [1960] regulations relying heavily on local
law, and finally to the 1965 regulations, which cast almost all
"doubtful" cases (or at least professional organizations) into the
partnership category.2 5
In view of the government's vacillation from initially encouraging
the finding of corporate existence in doubtful cases, to later discouraging the finding of corporate existence in doubtful cases, it
can hardly be claimed that section 7701(a) (2) has been the subject
of consistent and long-standing administrative interpretation. Thus,
the O'Neill court concluded "that there is no support for this
discrimination either in the cases or by reason of statutory interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code."2
The court lastly questioned whether discrimination against professional corporations in section 301.7701-2 (h) could be supported
by strong tax policy considerations. One justification advocated
by the government is that professional corporations do "not earn
the kind of income normally earned by a corporation."2 7 However,
[t]he fallacy of this argument is readily apparent when one con-

siders the large number of corporations presently existing in our
economy whose primary income is earned solely from the personal
services of their employees. The corporate tax status of businesses
engaged in advertising or promotion, investigation, sales, contract
24
2

Id.

supra note 1, at 32-33. The case referred to is United States v. Kintner,
216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
5Eaton,

26 281
27

F. Supp. at 364.

Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
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janitorial or secretarial service, to name a few,
has not been ser28
iously questioned to the Court's knowledge.
The O'Neill court here concluded that "as a matter of tax policy
[it could] . . . not see any factual or legal characteristics which

would justify different tax treatment of closely held professional
service organizations, on the one hand, and closely held non-professional organizations, on the other hand.""9
Having found the discriminatory treatment of professional corporations to be unsupported by "statute, judicial precedent, or sound
tax policy,""ao the O'Neill court concluded that section 301.77012(h) of the Treasury Regulations was invalid and judicially unenforceable. Turning to sections 301.7701-2(a-g), the court found
that Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. exhibited characteristics which resembled the characteristics of corporations in general" and rendered
judgment for the plaintiff and granted his request for a refund.
In considering subsections (a-g) of section 301.7701-2, the
O'Neill court and other courts 2 have failed to direct themselves
specifically to the government's contention that professional corporations do not meet the corporate characteristics necessary for
corporate tax treatment as outlined in section 301.7701-2(h).M
Instead, the courts have been content to conclude that the stringent
requirements for professional incorporation under the regulations
are not supported by "statute, judicial precedent, or sound tax
policy." It would seem that a more logical approach would be for
the courts first to set out the specific instances of discrimination
within the regulations, and then to conclude that such discrimination itself is not supported by "statute, judicial precedent, or sound
tax policy."
The first instance of discrimination within section 301.77012(h) of the regulations 'is seen in the required corporate characteristic of centralized management.34 The contention here is that the
281d.
29

Id. at 364.

30OId.
See notes 11-13 supra & accompanying text.
Holder v. United States, No. 801 (N.D. Ga., July 18, 1968); Kurzner v. United
States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851
(D. Colo. 1967) (appeal pending).
33 Brief for Defendant at 19-23, O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D.
Ohio 1968).
34 Since associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains
therefrom are generally common to both corporations and partnerships, the
determination of whether an organization which has such characteristics is
31
32
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professional relationship with a client or patient must always remain
confidential and that the professional person cannot be subject to
corporate control in the handling of clients and patients and still
preserve the professional obligation of confidentiality. 5 At this
point, however, the courts could point out that all other business
organizations striving to meet the corporate requirement of centralized management need show only that some general overriding
policy of management is in existence." The conclusion could then
be drawn that a standard of centralized management so strict as
to interfere with each and every decision made by a professional
person with respect to every client is discriminatory and invalidY7
A second instance of discrimination within the regulations can
be found in the section on limited liability. The contention made
is that a professional person cannot claim that his liability is
limited to the extent of ,his shareholder interest in the corporanon" while he denies liability for his professional wrongdoings."
Here the courts ought to find that "[ijt is not uncommon for shareholders of [ordinary] business corporations to assume certain liabilities" beyond their shareholder interest. ° Thus, the courts would
to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership or as an association depends on
whether there exists centralization of management, continuity of life, free
transferability of interests, and limited liability. Treas. Reg. § 301.77012 (1965) (emphasis added).
35 In applying the rules... relating to centralization of management, a professional service organization . . .under local law [is] not vested with the
continuing exclusive authority to determine any one or more of the following matters: (i)The hiring and firing of professional... and lay employees,
(ii) the compensation of the members and of such employees, (iii) the
conditions of employment - such as working hours, vacation periods, and
sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be accepted as clients or patients, (v)
who will handle each individual case or matter, (vi) the professional policies
and procedures to be followed in handling each individual case, (vii) the
fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) the nature of the records to be
kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix) the times and amounts of distributions of the earnings of the organizations to its members as such. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(3) (1965).
36
"Officers in ordinary business corporations are allowed to exercise independent
judgment in day-to-day operations, so long as this is within the framework of broad
policy established by the board of directors." Eaton, supra note 1, at 42-43.
37
"Probably not even ordinary, nonregulated businesses could comply with the
rigid standards here applied to the professions." Id. at 42. But see Bittker, supra
note 4, at 14-15.
38 "A professional service organization has the corporate characteristic of limited
liability ... only if the personal liability of its members, in their capacity as members
of the organization, is no greater in any aspect than that of shareholder-employees of
an ordinary business corporation." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4) (1965).
39 Bittker, supra note 4, at 13.
40
Eaton, supra note 1, at 44. Eaton goes on to say that "many jurisdictions have
statutes imposing special assessments; and even federal taxes are collectible from
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conclude that a ruling that requires the liability of a professional
corporation's members to be limited in every aspect of their relationship to the corporation.
The third instance of discrimination within section 301.77012(h) is seen in the area of free transferability. Here, the argument made is that the corporate characteristic of free transferability
is not met by the professional corporation if there exists a stipulation that all shares of stock must be sold only to licensed professionals and that in the event of the death of a shareholder, the
stock must be first offered to the corporation before it can be sold
to others. 4 The courts might well rule that, even though there are
restrictions attached to the transferability of professional corporation stock, the restrictions are scarcely sufficient to find the element
of free transferability totally lacking."
Indeed, the courts could
hold that the unique requirement, that professional corporation
stock must be freely transferable to anyone at any time, is unduly
strict and clearly discriminatory and invalid.
The final instance of discrimination within the regulations is
found in the section dealing with continuity of life. The contendon here is that personal agreements among professional members of an organization to repurchase the stock of members whose
employment relationship has terminated does not satisfy the corporate requirement of continuity of life under the regulations."
shareholders under the rules of transferee liability of section 6901. None of these
encroachments on pure limited liability has ever been held to diminish corporate status."
Id. See also Scallen, sapra note 20, at 685.
41 [I]f the interest of a member of a professional service organization constitutes a right to share in the profits of the organization which is contingent
upon and inseparable from the member's continuing employment relationship with the organization, and the transfer of such interest is subject to a
right of first refusal, such interest is subject to a power in the other members
of the organization to determine not only the individuals whom the organization is to employ, but also who may share with them in the profits of the
organization. ...
[Ilf a member of a professional service organization who
possesses such an interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person who
is not a member of the organization only after having first offered his interest to the other members of the organization at its fair market value, the
corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests does not exist.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(5)(ii) (1965).
42
See Eaton, supra note 1, at 46. But see Bittker, supra note 4, at 20.
43 If local law, applicable regulations, or professional ethics do not permit a
member of a professional service organization to share in its profits unless
an employment relationship exists between him and the organization, and
if in such case, he or his estate is required to dispose of his interest in the
organization if the employment relationship terminates, the continuing
existence of the organization depends upon the willingness of its remaining
members, if any, either to agree, by prior arrangement or at the time of such
termination, to acquire his interest or to employ his proposed successor. The
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The courts should hold that the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life has generally been applied to the continued existence of an
organization and not necessarily to the continued existence of an
organization's shareholders or employees.44 The courts could then
conclude that the regulation is discriminatory and invalid in directing that the corporate characteristic of continuity of life be geared
to the continued existence of the individual shareholder and not to
the continued existence of the professional corporation.
In dealing specifically with the government's contention that
professional corporations do not meet the corporate characteristics
necessary for corporate tax treatment, the courts would not only

present a more thorough analysis with respect to the issue of the
validity of the regulations, -but they would also have established a
strong foundation upon which to find that the instances of discrimination within the regulations are not supported by "statute,
judicial precedent or sound tax policy." The courts' analysis,
however, should not stop here.
The 1965 Treasury Regulations were issued by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service to halt the growth of professional corporations 5 More precisely, these regulations were an
attempt to preclude professional people from enjoying the benefits
of corporate tax treatment under the federal income tax laws. The
severe attitude adopted by the Commissioner, as evidenced by the
stringent requirements for professional incorporation, was founded
on the belief "that professional corporations are 'inherently different' from... ordinary business corporations."4 Thus far, only the
validity of the regulations has been challenged by the courts. The
real issue, however, is whether the professional corporation is so
inherently different from the ordinary business organization as to
justify denial of corporate tax treatment under the federal tax law.
An examination of the legislative history of the federal tax
laws reveals that corporations have always been permitted to retain
excess profits in the hope that these profits might be reinvested
continued existence of such a professional service organization is similar to
that of a partnership formed under the Uniform Partnership Act, whose business continues pursuant to an agreement providing that the business will be
continued by the remaining members after the withdrawal or death of a
partner... and is essentially different from the continuity of life possessed
by an ordinary business corporation. Consequently, such a professional service
organization lacks continuity of life. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2) (1965).
44
Eaton, supra note 1, at 40. But see Bittker, supra note 4, at 17.
45
See note 3 supra.
46
Eaton, supra note 12, at 671-72; Eaton, supra note 1, at 36-37.

